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A COPYRIGHT RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Reid Kress Weisbord*
What would Brian Boitano do / if he were here today?
–South Park: Bigger, Longer & Uncut1

This Article identifies a striking asymmetry in the law’s disparate
treatment of publicity-rights holders and copyright holders. State-law
publicity rights generally protect individuals from unauthorized use of their
name and likeness by others. Publicity-claim liability, however, is limited
by the First Amendment’s protection for expressive speech embodying a
“transformative use” of the publicity-rights holder’s identity. This Article
examines for the first time a further limitation imposed by copyright law:
when a publicity-rights holder’s identity is transformatively depicted in a
copyrighted work without consent, the author’s copyright can produce the
peculiar result of enjoining the publicity-rights holder from using or
engaging in speech about her own depiction. This Article offers novel
contributions to the literature on copyright overreach and: (1) identifies a
legal asymmetry produced in the interplay of publicity rights, copyright
law, and the First Amendment; (2)
examines the burdens on
constitutionally protected speech, autonomy, and liberty interests of
publicity-rights holders when copyright law prevents or constrains use of
their own depiction; and (3) outlines a framework for recognizing a
“copyright right of publicity” to exempt the publicity-rights holder’s use
from copyright infringement liability. Notably, this Article contributes
uniquely to the literature by revealing new insights gained from an
exclusive first-hand perspective of an internationally recognized celebrity
whose persona was prominently depicted without prior notice or consent in
a wide-release feature film.

* Vice Dean, Professor of Law, and Judge Norma L. Shapiro Scholar, Rutgers School of
Law-Newark. I am extremely grateful to Brian Boitano for his participation in this project.
For generous and helpful feedback on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Jamil Ammar,
Carlos Ball, Bernard Bell, Gary Francione, Carlos Gonzalez, David Horton, John Kettle,
Chrystin Ondersma, George Thomas, and Stephen Urice. This Article also greatly benefited
from workshop presentations at Rutgers Law School and Fordham Law School. A debt of
gratitude is owed to Michael A. Alden for his support of this project.
1. TREY PARKER & MARC SHAIMAN, What Would Brian Boitano Do?, on SOUTH PARK:
BIGGER, LONGER & UNCUT—MUSIC FROM AND INSPIRED BY THE MOTION PICTURE (Atlantic
1999).
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INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity generally protects individuals from unauthorized
use of their name and likeness by others.2 Debate and discussion of
publicity rights loom large in the academic literature, which has grown to
include more than 3700 works of published scholarship.3 Despite this
massive outpouring of interest, however, no scholarship to date has taken
into account the first-hand perspective of a celebrity who has lived through
the extraordinary experience of having one’s identity prominently depicted
and widely published without prior notice or consent.4 This Article fills
that void by presenting an exclusive, first-hand celebrity narrative that
reveals new and significant insight about a previously overlooked
intersection of publicity rights, copyright law, and the First Amendment. In
particular, this insight expounds upon a previously overlooked implication
of the First Amendment’s protection of an author’s expressive speech that
depicts a publicity-rights holder’s identity in a “transformative use.”5 The
First Amendment freedom of speech generally overrides the personality’s
publicity rights in this context, but, significantly, because the author’s
transformative depiction is automatically entitled to copyright protection
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
3. A search of the Westlaw journal and law review database for “right /2 publicity”
returned 3710 results on June 2, 2015.
4. A review of every author who published legal scholarship containing the terms
“right /2 publicity” in the Westlaw journal and law review database as of June 2, 2015,
revealed no works published by an author of discernable fame or prominence outside the
sphere of legal academia, except for a short essay on the need for national uniformity of
publicity-rights law by American actor Richard Masur. See generally Richard Masur, Right
of Publicity from the Performer’s Point of View, 10 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L. 253 (2000).
5. See infra note 55 (explaining the transformative use doctrine).
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upon its rendering in a fixed medium, the author’s copyright protection can
produce the peculiar, if not anomalous, outcome of enjoining the
appropriated personality from using or engaging in speech about her own
depiction in the copyrighted work.6 This arguably counterintuitive outcome
reveals a marked legal asymmetry favoring the interests of copyright
holders over publicity-rights holders, an asymmetry that, I argue, harmfully
contributes to a broader undesirable trend toward the overreach of modern
American copyright law.7 Before beginning our interstitial analysis of
publicity rights, copyright law, and the First Amendment, however, let us
set the stage for this inquiry by recounting the cinematic depiction of
Olympic figure skating gold medalist Brian Boitano.8
In 1999, comedy writers Trey Parker and Matt Stone wrote, directed, and
produced the suggestively titled animated feature film, South Park: Bigger,
Longer & Uncut,9 based on their successful television series, South Park.10
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. For a sampling of the literature on copyright overreach, see NEIL WEINSTOCK
NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 54–80 (2008) (chronicling “[c]opyright’s [u]ngainly
[e]xpansion”); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 5
(2002); Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740 (2013)
(reviewing JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW (2011)) (“Complaints have been legion that copyright industry groups and corporate
copyright owners have sought and too often obtained extremely strong and overly long
copyright protections that interfere with downstream creative endeavors and legitimate
consumer expectations.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). For the
contours of this debate, compare JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0
AND YOU (2011) (criticizing the trend toward increasing copyright scope and infringement
liability), with Peter S. Menell, Infringement Conflation, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (2012)
(reviewing TEHRANIAN, supra) (asserting the legitimate role of copyright law in combating
unauthorized file sharing).
8. Brian Boitano won the Olympic gold medal for figure skating at the 1988 Winter
Games in Calgary, Canada, and was appointed by President Barack Obama to the United
States Olympic Delegation to the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia. In total,
Boitano, a three-time Olympian, has won more professional titles than any other skater in the
history of the sport, including twenty-three international gold medals, two world titles, two
Pro/AM titles, sixteen professional titles, four U.S. national titles, and the Olympic gold
medal. The first male figure skater to appear on the cover of Sports Illustrated, Boitano
single-handedly changed the face of professional figure skating and has produced and starred
in more than thirty network television skating specials, including Canvas of Ice (ABC) and
The Brian Boitano Skating Spectacular (NBC). Mr. Boitano received a Primetime Emmy
Award for Outstanding Performance in Classical Music/Dance Programming for Carmen on
Ice and was inducted into the U.S. and World Figure Skating Halls of Fame. Off the ice, Mr.
Boitano has created and starred in televised lifestyle programming on the Food Network,
What Would Brian Boitano Make? (2009 and 2010), and HGTV, The Brian Boitano Project
(2014). Mr. Boitano’s HGTV series garnered the highest ratings ever for a home
improvement series. Boitano’s book, BOITANO’S EDGE: INSIDE THE REAL WORLD OF FIGURE
SKATING (1997), currently in its third printing, is considered one of the finest written works
on figure skating. See Biographical Memorandum on Brian Boitano (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
9. SOUTH PARK: BIGGER, LONGER & UNCUT (Comedy Central Films et al. 1999)
[hereinafter SOUTH PARK].
10. South Park (Comedy Central).
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The film, distributed in wide release by Paramount Pictures domestically
and Warner Brothers internationally,11 holds the box office record for gross
receipts generated by a fully animated R-rated movie12 and received an
Academy Award nomination for Best Original Song.13 The film depicts an
outlandish dispute between a cast of precocious school-age children and
their paternalistic parents, who seek to ban and boycott an obscenity-laced
Canadian film, “Terrance and Phillip: Asses of Fire,” much beloved by the
kids.14 South Park’s fantastical storyline portrays conflict over the film’s
censorship, escalating into military hostilities between the United States and
Canada after the United States threatens to execute Canadians Terrance and
Phillip.15 The turning point in the plot occurs when the children band
together and vow to rescue Terrance and Phillip.16 In that scene, the
children perform a song written by Trey Parker and composer Marc
Shaiman titled, “What Would Brian Boitano Do?,” parodying both Brian
Boitano and the evangelical religious phrase, “What would Jesus do?”17
The song’s lyrics recount Boitano’s figure skating performance at the
1988 Olympic Winter Games in Calgary, Canada, in which American Brian
Boitano famously defeated Canadian Brian Orser to win the Olympic gold
medal. In approximately two minutes of film, the singing children invoke
Boitano’s name fifteen times while fantasizing about his heroic quest to
save humanity. The song portrays Boitano as possessing superhuman traits,
traits that the film depicts Boitano using to rescue victims of persecution at
various landmark moments in history (and the future). During the song, the
film’s animation visually depicts Boitano’s clearly identifiable likeness,
moving about the screen on figure skates while dressed in distinctive figure
skating performance attire. Inspired by Boitano’s valor, the children
conclude by marching into the sunset to save Terrance and Phillip from
execution, “’[c]ause that’s what Brian Boitano [would] do.”18
Despite his prominent depiction in the film, Boitano first saw his
animated portrayal only after its public release. The film’s producers,
undoubtedly well-advised by legal counsel and familiar with the First
11. South Park: Bigger, Longer & Uncut: Company Credits, IMDB, http://www.
imdb.com/title/tt0158983/companycredits?ref_=tt_ql_10 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://
perma.cc/E4DD-MA3G].
12. In 2012, Ted, an R-rated live-action film featuring computer generated animation,
surpassed South Park’s box office receipts, but South Park remains the highest grossing fully
animated R-rated movie. See, e.g., Amid Amidi, “Ted” Is the Highest-Grossing R-Rated
Animated Feature of All-Time, CARTOON BREW (July 1, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://www.
cartoonbrew.com/cgi/ted-is-the-highest-grossing-r-rated-animated-feature-of-all-time65666.html [https://perma.cc/N7G5-PXY8].
13. See The 72nd Academy Awards, 2000, OSCARS, https://www.oscars.org/oscars/
ceremonies/2000 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (noting that “Blame Canada” was nominated
for Best Original Song) [https://perma.cc/8MKH-8DVQ].
14. See SOUTH PARK, supra note 9.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; What Would Brian Boitano Do? Lyrics, METROLYRICS, http://www.metro
lyrics.com/what-would-brian-boitano-do-lyrics-south-park.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/4ZYV-G7D4].
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Amendment’s protection of speech and creative works of expression, safely
assumed they had no legal obligation to obtain prior consent from Boitano
for use of his name and likeness; nor were they likely to have any legal
obligation under the right of publicity to compensate Boitano for the film’s
use of his persona in this context. Under the First Amendment, an
individual generally cannot assert the right of publicity to withhold
permission or demand payment for the use of one’s name or likeness where
the depicted persona is embodied in a “transformative use.”19 The First
Amendment’s abridgment of publicity rights, while subject to continuing
debate about its scope and application, largely is settled as a first
principle.20
In an exclusive statement prepared for this Article, Boitano submits the
following narrative recounting his experience learning about and reacting to
his depiction in the South Park film:
I first heard about the South Park film from a friend of mine with
Hollywood connections, and I was a little nervous about how the creators,
Matt Stone and Trey Parker, would treat me in their movie. They were
known for controversial parodies and brilliant satires that often skewered
their subjects. So I was relieved to see that I was portrayed in a lighthearted spirit.
As a result of the film, I gained many new young-adult fans who
associated me with South Park. The film itself was very successful, and it
became part of pop culture. My portrayal as the savior of the world was
very funny, and I embraced it from the very beginning.
Later I obtained permission from the owners of the South Park song,
What Would Brian Boitano Do?, to use that phrase on merchandise which
was sold in support of my charity, Youth Skate. In addition, they granted
me the right to use a version of the song as a lead in to my cooking series
on the Food Network, What Would Brian Boitano Make? To this day my
role in South Park comes up in half the interviews I do whether for
skating or food-related subjects.21

Boitano’s experience, while notably positive, reveals a stark asymmetry
in the law. In the interplay of publicity rights, copyright law, and the First
Amendment freedom of expression, authorial-rights holders receive
markedly preferential legal treatment compared to publicity-rights holders.
When a personality’s name or likeness is transformatively depicted in a
creative work of expression, the First Amendment precludes that
personality from asserting publicity rights to withhold permission or
demanding compensation for the depiction; but under copyright law, the
copyright owner of the depiction acquires the right to both withhold
permission and demand compensation for the personality’s use of his own
depiction in the copyrighted work.22 This asymmetry has the potential for
sweeping implications in a host of intellectual contexts, such as the genre of
unauthorized biography, where a person depicted without consent may be
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
Statement of Brian Boitano (Sept. 24, 2015) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
See infra Part I.B.
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foreclosed from using her own depiction without a license from the
copyright holder of the biography.23
This Article, the primary objective of which is to expound upon this
peculiar interaction of publicity rights and copyright law, proceeds as
follows: Part I recounts the historical development of publicity rights,
describes the liability limitations imposed by the First Amendment on the
right of publicity, and explains how the intersection of publicity rights,
copyright law, and the First Amendment yields preferential treatment for
copyright holders at the expense of publicity-rights holders. In particular, I
argue that the First Amendment provides a stronger speech-based
affirmative defense for the unauthorized use of a publicity-rights holder’s
identity than for the unauthorized use of a copyright holder’s work of
authorship, a legal asymmetry exacerbated by market factors chilling
incentives for publicity-rights holders to test the merits of a colorable
copyright fair use defense in court. These subtle distinctions between the
two affirmative defenses adversely affect the economic value of publicity
rights as compared to copyright protection, but more interestingly, they
impose arguably anomalous constraints on the publicity-rights holder’s
freedoms of speech, autonomy, and liberty.
Part II expands upon this anomalous treatment by examining the
Constitution’s protection of the publicity right holder’s speech, liberty, and
autonomy interests under the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech
Clause and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ substantive due process
provisions. However, upon considering the limited scope of constitutional
protection in these contexts, I conclude that reform providing copyright
exemption for the publicity-rights holder should not directly invoke the
Constitution.
Part III draws upon the broader legal principles underlying the
constitutional protections of speech, liberty, and autonomy to propose a
framework for recognizing a “copyright right of publicity” on normative
policy grounds through a more expansive interpretation of the copyright fair
use doctrine or, alternatively, a statutory categorical exemption from
copyright infringement liability affording greater leeway for the publicityrights holder’s use of his own depiction.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE
PREDOMINANCE OF AUTHORIAL RIGHTS
This part surveys the development of state-law publicity rights, liability
limitations imposed by the First Amendment, and the intersection of
publicity rights and copyright law. It then explains how these interacting
principles produce markedly preferential treatment for authorial-rights
holders as compared to publicity-rights holders.

23. For a normative legal and literary theory of biography, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The
Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299, 342–60 (1991).
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A. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity traces its roots to early commentary on privacy by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, as published in their canonic 1890
Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy.24 Warren and Brandeis
argued that unwelcome publicity had the potential to inflict psychological
harm, and so, to keep apace with evolving legal protection for the infliction
of physical harm, the law also should protect at least a minimal threshold of
emotional equilibrium for persons who wish “to be let alone.”25 The right
to privacy, as Warren and Brandeis conceived it, protected private
individuals from the spectacle of unwanted exposure and publicity in the
press, but it did not apply to matters of public interest.26 According to
Warren and Brandeis, “There are persons who may reasonably claim as a
right, protection from the notoriety entailed by being made the victims of
journalistic enterprise. There are others who, in varying degrees, have
renounced the right to live their lives screened from public observation.”27
This construction of privacy gave individuals who otherwise were private in
their routine affairs the right to opt-out of unwanted publicity, but it did not
explicitly contemplate the possibility that public figures could assert such a
right, let alone hold an exclusive right to control, exploit, and profit from
fame in a public setting.
Following the turn of the twentieth century, the earliest identity
appropriation cases involved claims by private individuals for mental
anguish resulting from the unauthorized use of their likenesses in
commercial advertisements.28 But as the privacy doctrine meandered and
evolved over the ensuing decades, public figures began asserting privacy
claims that, in essence, sought remuneration for the unauthorized
commercial appropriation of their persona, rather than damages for mental
anguish arising from unwanted publicity.29 Courts initially viewed such

24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
25. Id. at 195 (quoting COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
26. See id. at 214–15 (“The design of the law must be to protect those persons with
whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into an
undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons, whatsoever; their position or
station, from having matters which they may properly prefer to keep private, made public
against their will.”).
27. Id. at 215.
28. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68–69 (Ga. 1905)
(recognizing a right of privacy where the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s likeness on
an advertisement for life insurance and featured a quotation falsely attributable to the
plaintiff); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (finding no
liability where defendant appropriated plaintiff’s likeness on a poster advertisement for
flour).
29. Cf. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1210 (2004) (“As critics complain, the ‘right of publicity’ has
tended to lose all of its moorings in the Warren and Brandeis idea of privacy, becoming
essentially a vehicle for protecting the enterprises of celebrities like Bette Midler and Vanna
White.”).
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claims by public figures as incongruous with privacy doctrine,30 but
commentators later distinguished privacy rights—which protect the right to
be free from unwanted publicity—from publicity rights—which grant an
exclusive right to control and exploit one’s name and likeness.31 Soon
enough, courts, too, began to accept publicity rights as doctrinally distinct
from privacy rights.32
By the 1960s, legal scholarship began to endorse the distinction between
privacy and publicity rights more fully, as influential commentary by
Harold Gordon and Professor William Prosser sought to situate the right of
publicity as a property interest.33 Meanwhile, other scholars, such as
Professor Edward Bloustein,34 continued to adhere to the Warren-Brandeis
notion of privacy by characterizing publicity rights as an integral aspect of
human dignity, not as a property interest. Under Bloustein’s view (and
critique of Prosser’s proprietarian theory), publicity rights protected the
right to demand a commercial price for relinquishing one’s privacy.35 But
the proprietarian view generally has prevailed,36 with courts, including the
U.S. Supreme Court, likening publicity rights to intellectual property and
recognizing that protection for publicity rights creates economic incentives
for individuals to engage in socially useful activities that enhance the
market value of their identity.37 The proprietarian view of publicity rights
30. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (finding no
claim for invasion of privacy where the plaintiff athlete’s image was used on a beer
advertisement, because “the publicity he got was only that which he had been constantly
seeking and receiving”).
31. See generally, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203 (1954) (arguing that publicity rights should be distinct from privacy rights).
32. See, e.g., Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953) (recognizing a right of publicity).
33. Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
NW. U. L. REV. 553, 554 (1960) (arguing that the doctrine “became confused” when public
figures began resorting to privacy rights to redress appropriation of one’s persona for
commercial purposes); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960)
(characterizing “appropriation” as “not so much a mental as a proprietary [interest], in the
exclusive use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness as an aspect of his identity”).
34. From 1971 to 1989, Professor Bloustein also served as President of Rutgers
University, the institution where my faculty appointment resides. Edward J. Bloustein,
RUTGERS, http://www.rutgers.edu/about/history/past-presidents/edward-j-bloustein (last
visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2X4H-DN3F].
35. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 989 (1964); see also supra notes 24–27 and
accompanying text (discussing the Warren-Brandeis notion of privacy). But see Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1181–82 (2006) (arguing that publicity rights cannot be justified on
theories of human dignity).
36. Cf. Whitman, supra note 29, at 1210 (noting that “an American interest in one’s
‘publicity’ is an interest in one’s property, not an interest in one’s honor”).
37. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)
(“Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on more than a desire to
compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the protection provides
an economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of
interest to the public. This same consideration underlies the patent and copyright laws long
enforced by this Court.”); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“Protecting one’s name or likeness from misappropriation is socially beneficial because it
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also has led to the recognition of descendible postmortem publicity rights in
a number of jurisdictions.38
Under the modern right of publicity, as articulated by the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition, “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial
value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name,
likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability for the [appropriate] relief.”39 Although the Constitution has been
interpreted to imply a limited array of fundamental liberty interests, some of
which involve elements of privacy,40 the right of publicity is not among
them.41 Publicity rights therefore arise under state law, which is based on
the common law in twenty-one states and statutory law in eighteen states
A
where legislatures have acted to protect publicity rights.42
complementary area of federal law, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,43
supplements state-law publicity rights by providing a civil action for false
affiliation, designation of origin, or endorsement in connection with goods
or services used in interstate commerce.44 Under the Lanham Act, a
personality whose depiction has been used without permission may recover
damages where the contested depiction falsely implies an affiliation or
endorsement by the personality of the goods or services promoted in
connection with the misappropriated persona.45
B. First Amendment Limitations on Publicity-Claim Liability
Natural tension resides at the intersection of publicity rights and free
speech.46 On the one hand, the value of publicity rights is almost always
enhanced by the public’s use of and speech about the persona because the
commercial value of and demand for a persona is often a direct function of
the overall volume of speech in the public discourse about the personality.
encourages people to develop special skills, which then can be used for commercial
advantage.”).
38. See David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CAL. L. REV. 543, 561–63 (2014).
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
40. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (noting that cases have “routinely
categorized the decision to marry as among the personal decisions protected by the right of
privacy”).
41. This perhaps reflects the implicit acceptance of the doctrinal distinction between
noneconomic aspects of privacy protected by the Constitution and the proprietary interests of
publicity rights more aptly situated along a branch of unfair competition law.
42. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3 (2d ed.
2015). States with statutory protection for publicity rights include California, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See id. § 6:3 nn.8–9.
43. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Almost fifty years ago, Professor Melville Nimmer described a similar tension
between speech and copyright protection as a “largely ignored paradox.” Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1970). Nimmer’s characterization of this tension
likely served as inspiration for the title of Professor Neil Netanel’s recent monograph,
Copyright’s Paradox, cited supra note 7.
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For example, setting aside the political merits, the fact that, as of this
writing, more than six months of the entire national discourse concerning
the 2016 presidential election has been wholly consumed by media
coverage and discussion of Donald Trump has to have had a positive effect
on the commercial value of Mr. Trump’s publicity rights.47 On the other
hand, publicity rights operate by granting the owner exclusionary rights,
thus allowing the personality to enjoin or charge for use of her persona.48
Exclusionary rights may be waived or not asserted, so the right of publicity
operates by allowing the right holder to decide whether to permit the use of
her persona. The very existence of publicity rights, therefore, tends to chill
speech about the personality because the right creates at least the threat of
possible liability for use of the persona. Given this tension, for both
interests to coexist, the law must strike a balance between publicity rights
and free speech; without a legal standard to determine when one interest
should trump49 the other, publicity rights would untenably constrain speech,
and the freedom of speech would obliterate publicity rights.
In striking a balance between these oft-competing interests, the law
generally favors speech over publicity rights.50 Unlike publicity rights,
which arise under preemptable state law, the freedom of speech is expressly
Thus, an
and supremely protected under the First Amendment.51
individual’s publicity rights generally end—full stop—when another
individual’s free speech begins.52 The right of publicity inhibits the

47. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Karen Yourish, Measuring Donald Trump’s
Mammoth Advantage in Free Media, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/03/16/upshot/measuring-donald-trumps-mammoth-advantage-in-freemedia.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/ED4Y-SNTJ].
48. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2016). The New York Civil
Rights Law provides:
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first
obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court
of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait,
picture or voice, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and
recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the
defendant shall have knowingly used such person’s name, portrait, picture or voice
in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section fifty of this
article, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.
Id.
49. Pun intended.
50. See generally, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332
F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d
959 (10th Cir. 1996); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Winter v. DC
Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797
(Cal. 2001); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”).
52. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1995) (“The right of publicity as recognized by statute and common law is fundamentally
constrained by the public and constitutional interest in freedom of expression. The use of a
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freedom of expression when it prevents or constrains speech concerning a
person’s identity, but not all forms of expression are protected under the
First Amendment in this context.53 Courts therefore have developed
various balancing tests to demarcate the boundary between publicity rights
and First Amendment speech interests,54 chief among them the influential
“transformative use” test adapted from the copyright fair use doctrine.55
Under the transformative use test, courts evaluate whether the challenged
work depicting the celebrity’s persona “merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of
the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent
the new work is ‘transformative.’”56 In Comedy III Products, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc.,57 the California Supreme Court described the test as
assessing
whether the celebrity likeness is one of the “raw materials” from which an
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the
celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question. We ask,
in other words, whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression
rather than the celebrity’s likeness. And when we use the word
“expression,” we mean expression of something other than the likeness of
the celebrity.58

Under this test, an individual, whether or not a celebrity, cannot recover
damages for a violation of the right of publicity when the depicted identity
has been transformed into a new creative work of expression. At bottom,
the transformative test evaluates a challenged depiction by ascertaining
person’s identity primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing
ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person’s right of publicity.”).
53. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (finding that
the First Amendment did not immunize defendant’s wholesale broadcast of plaintiff’s human
cannonball stunt on the local news from plaintiff’s state-law publicity claim).
54. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 152–65 (3d Cir. 2013) (surveying
the various judicial tests for demarking the boundary between publicity rights and protected
speech).
55. Pursuant to federal statute, courts must balance the following four factors in
determining whether the secondary use is a “fair use” of the copyrighted work:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
The transformative use test in copyright law is based on the first statutory factor. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
56. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001)
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
57. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
58. Id. at 809.
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whether the use embodies speech worthy of constitutional protection apart
from its replication of the persona. Notably, this constitutional limitation
on publicity-claim liability applies even when the transformative depiction
is, itself, sold for profit by the secondary user.59
In Comedy III Products, the landmark case recognizing the
transformative use test in a publicity-rights claim, the court went on to hold
that the challenged charcoal depictions of the Three Stooges sold by the
defendant on T-shirts and lithographs for a profit of $75,000 did not
sufficiently transform the images of the late celebrities because the charcoal
drawing represented mere “literal, conventional depictions of the Three
Stooges.”60 In permitting the plaintiff’s assertion of publicity rights, the
court also noted that “the marketability and economic value of [the artwork]
derive[d] primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted.”61
Subsequently, courts applying the transformative use test have held as
sufficiently transformed—and, therefore, entitled to First Amendment
protection—a comic book depiction of recording artists Johnny and Edgar
Winter62 and a painting of golfer Tiger Woods commemorating his win at
the 1997 Masters Tournament.63 By contrast, in recent class action
59. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that
First Amendment speech protection applied where the defendant “published and marketed
two hundred and fifty 22 1/2” x 30” serigraphs and five thousand 9” x 11” lithographs of The
Masters of Augusta at an issuing price of $700 for the serigraphs and $100 for the
lithographs”); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970
(10th Cir. 1996) (“The fact that expressive materials are sold neither renders the speech
unprotected nor alters the level of protection under the First Amendment.”); cf. Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (“That books, newspapers, and
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of
expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”).
60. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811.
61. Id.
62. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003). The court in Winter described
the five-volume miniseries of Jonah Hex comics at issue as follows:
The series contains an outlandish plot, involving giant worm-like creatures,
singing cowboys, and the “Wilde West Ranch and Music and Culture Emporium,”
named for and patterned after the life of Oscar Wilde. The third volume ends with
a reference to two new characters, the “Autumn brothers,” and the teaser, “Next:
The Autumns of Our Discontent.” The cover of volume 4 depicts the Autumn
brother characters, with pale faces and long white hair. . . . One brother wears a
stovepipe hat and red sunglasses, and holds a rifle. The second has red eyes and
holds a pistol. This volume is entitled, Autumns of Our Discontent, and features
brothers Johnny and Edgar Autumn, depicted as villainous half-worm, half-human
offspring born from the rape of their mother by a supernatural worm creature that
had escaped from a hole in the ground. At the end of volume 5, Jonah Hex and his
companions shoot and kill the Autumn brothers in an underground gun battle.
Id.
63. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 918. Here, the court described the painting at issue as
follows:
In the foreground of Rush’s painting are three views of Woods in different poses.
In the center, he is completing the swing of a golf club, and on each side he is
crouching, lining up and/or observing the progress of a putt. To the left of Woods
is his caddy, Mike “Fluff” Cowan, and to his right is his final round partner’s
caddy. Behind these figures is the Augusta National Clubhouse. In a blue
background behind the clubhouse are likenesses of famous golfers of the past
looking down on Woods. These include Arnold Palmer, Sam Snead, Ben Hogan,
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litigation involving claims by college and professional athletes against
producers of video games depicting the athletes as interactive, lifelike, ballplaying avatars, both the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
held that the avatars were insufficiently transformative to warrant First
Amendment protection.64
Not unlike its copyright fair use counterpart, the transformative use test
in the publicity-claim context has been criticized by scholars for yielding
subjective, inconsistent, and arbitrary results.65 At its core, however, the
test attempts to resolve tension between speech and publicity rights by
allowing First Amendment speech interests to prevail over state-law
publicity interests.
When a challenged depiction is sufficiently
transformative, First Amendment principles prevail absolutely over
publicity rights, thereby granting the author nearly unfettered free use of the
personality’s name and likeness.66 Upon sufficient transformation, the
depicted personality surrenders entirely the right to withhold permission or
to demand compensation for the use of his name and likeness. In this
regard, the transformative use test produces binary outcomes: either the
challenged use is transformative (and the author prevails absolutely) or it is
not transformative (and the personality prevails absolutely).67 There are no
outcomes in between.

Walter Hagen, Bobby Jones, and Jack Nicklaus. Behind them is the Masters
leader board.
Id.
64. Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (ruling on defendants’ AntiSLAPP motion to dismiss and finding that the defendants did not have a reasonable
probability of prevailing on their claim that the First Amendment immunized liability for
infringing football players’ publicity rights); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir.
2013).
65. See, e.g., F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge:
The
“Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity
Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 73 (2003); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 916–17
(2003). For a searing critique of the copyright transformative use test, see Amy Adler, Fair
Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
66. See supra note 50 (citing cases).
67. An interesting counterproposal to the winner-take-all system, described by its
proponents as a “radical solution,” seeks to
fundamentally change our approach to the First Amendment as a necessarily
winner-take-all device for which compensation is never required. In its place, one
can imagine a “paid-for” First Amendment in the form of a compulsory publicity
license. Under this model, the plaintiff [i.e., the appropriated personality] would
not be able to censor the defendant’s speech, but likewise, even the expressive and
creative defendant (that is, a transformative user) could not free ride on the
plaintiff’s celebrity fame without having to pay fair-market-value compensation
for its profit-driven use. In essence, the fact finder could find that the challenged
use is sufficiently creative to continue but that a reasonable royalty must be paid.
The royalty would be based on the value of the celebrity image and could be offset
to the extent to which the transformative use derives substantial economic value
from the creativity of the defendant instead of merely or mostly from the fame of
the celebrity.
David Franklyn & Adam Kuhn, Owning Oneself in a World of Others: Towards a Paid-For
First Amendment, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 977, 979–80 (2014).
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C. First Amendment Speech Defenses and the
Asymmetrical Treatment of Copyright and Publicity Rights
Copyright law is almost always implicated by operation of law in the
interplay between publicity and authorial rights. With rare exception,
nearly every unauthorized depiction of a name or likeness challenged in a
publicity claim is, itself, embodied in a fixed work of authorship—such as a
book, film, television show, song, or image. This is significant because
copyright protection subsists, by operation of law, from the creation of a
work of authorship, so the author’s rendering of a personality’s depiction in
a fixed medium automatically grants the author exclusionary rights in the
work under copyright law as to all the world, including the depicted
personality.68 Conversely, because a person’s name and likeness is not
treated as a work of authorship for copyright purposes, the publicity-rights
holder’s persona is not itself entitled to copyright protection, even though
depictions of the person’s identity are copyrightable.69 As explained below,
this interplay between copyright protection and publicity-claim liability, in
turn, creates asymmetry between publicity and authorial rights favoring the
interests of authors and copyright holders over those of publicity-rights
holders.
Before examining the particulars of legal doctrine contributing to this
asymmetry, it may be useful to articulate and exemplify the broader contrast
in scope between the speech-based liability exemptions in the publicityclaim and copyright-infringement contexts. Consider the Tony Awardwinning Forbidden Broadway, a popular musical revue performed (and
periodically updated) off-Broadway since 1982, which is well-known for its
comedic parody of theatrical performers and performances.70 In its
signature irreverently parodic technique, Forbidden Broadway productions
frequently include a musical skit titled “Chita and Rita,” in which two
female performers depict the distinctive personas of actresses Rita Moreno
and Chita Rivera engaged in a fictitious (but ferociously sung) argument
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978, subsists from its creation . . . .”); id. § 101 (“A work is ‘created’ when it is fixed in a
copy or phonorecord for the first time . . . .”); id. § 106 (outlining a copyright holder’s
exclusive rights).
69. See Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
Copyright protection is not generally a defense to a publicity-rights claim. See MCCARTHY,
supra note 42, § 11.61; cf. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183, 1186
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that free speech rights prevailed over an actor’s publicity-rights claim
notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to obtain consent for use of copyrighted photograph
of the actor). Because name and likeness are not copyrightable, federal copyright law does
not preempt state law publicity rights. See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227
F.3d 619, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2000); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir.
1997); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (1996); see also Madeline O’Connor,
Comment, “It’s a Little Known Fact” That Copyright Law Is in Conflict with the Right of
Publicity, 26 TOURO L. REV. 351 (2010) (discussing the preemption interplay between
copyright law and publicity rights in the context of Wendt).
70. Jennifer Schuessler, Broadway Just Got More Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/theater/forbidden-broadway-alive-kickingshaping-a-spoof.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1346852505KcvubO0p9Fco3fdpFS5iHw [http://perma.cc/DXP2-NTA7].
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over who has a more authentic claim to the role of Anita in Leonard
Bernstein and Stephen Sondheim’s West Side Story.71 Evaluated under the
First Amendment-based transformative use test, “Chita and Rita” would
almost certainly be exempt from publicity-claim liability because, without
question, it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character”72 through its creative and satirical comment, particularly when
compared to the raw underlying personalities targeted by the depiction.73
By contrast, the leading copyright law treatise, Nimmer on Copyright,
opines that, had Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet not reverted to the public
domain, West Side Story itself could have been adjudged “substantially
similar” to the canonic work on which it was based under the “pattern test”
for copyright infringement.74
Closer examination and comparison of legal doctrines reveal a primary
source of this legal asymmetry arises from differing standards for asserting
speech-based affirmative defenses to copyright infringement and publicityclaim liability. The copyright fair use doctrine, an equitable doctrine with
notoriously wide give,75 generally imposes a heavier burden on alleged
copyright infringers asserting fair use as an affirmative defense than the
Constitution imposes on publicity-claim defendants asserting an affirmative
defense of First Amendment free speech. The differing standards for
establishing speech-based or speech-related liability exemptions create legal
asymmetry by making it easier for a defendant to override a personality’s
publicity rights than an author’s copyright.
Under copyright law, affirmative defenses based on First Amendment
speech rights generally are subsumed under the statutory speech protections
built into the copyright fair use doctrine; thus, copyright-infringement
defendants largely are limited to asserting the copyright fair use doctrine
because courts generally reject direct invocation of the First Amendment as

71. See Dorothy Kiara, Dorothy Kiara & Christine Pedi—Chita & Rita, YOUTUBE (Apr.
5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycAVkas_qoc [https://perma.cc/RVL9YN2V]. Note that the Forbidden Broadway depiction portrays Rivera and Moreno acting as
Rivera and Moreno, not as the character, Anita. See id. Rivera originated the role on the
Broadway stage in 1957, while Moreno starred as Anita in the 1961 motion picture. West
Side Story, INTERNET BROADWAY DATABASE, http://www.ibdb.com/Production/View/2639
(last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (Broadway) [https://perma.cc/UQ2S-27XA]; West Side Story:
Full Cast and Crew, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0055614/fullcredits?ref_=tt_ov_
st_sm (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (film) [https://perma.cc/CW6B-8LUP].
72. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
73. Cf. Nurmi v. Peterson, No. 88-CV-5436 (WMB), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9765, at *7
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1989) (dismissing publicity claim asserted against Cassandra Peterson,
who portrayed Elvira, a darkly dressed horror movie hostess, allegedly created to look
exactly like Vampira, the plaintiff’s character from the 1950s); Guglielmi v. SpellingGoldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (“The right of
publicity derived from public prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature,
parody and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative comment.”).
74. 4-13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (2015).
75. See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57,
62 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that “the fair use doctrine ‘is entirely equitable’” (quoting Time
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968))).
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an affirmative defense to copyright infringement.76 By contrast, under
state-law rights of publicity, a speech-based affirmative defense asserting
exemption for transformative use of a personality’s name or likeness arises
directly under the First Amendment because there is no statutory
affirmative defense comparable to the copyright fair use statute.77 This
difference between the affirmative defenses is significant because the First
Amendment, when asserted in defense of a publicity-rights claim, tends to
provide a broader scope of speech protection than the copyright fair use
defense against copyright infringement.
The comparably narrower copyright fair use defense derives its
narrowness, at least in part, from categorical limitations on fair use
enumerated by six illustrations in the statutory preamble: “for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”78 Courts have
interpreted the preamble’s illustrations as categorical examples that, while
neither exclusive nor exhaustive of potential fair use applications, require
an alleged infringer to show that the challenged use bears at least nontrivial
similarity of purpose.79 In comparison, under the right of publicity, the
First Amendment-based affirmative defense is categorically broader than
the copyright fair use doctrine because the First Amendment shields from
liability nearly all but “core” commercial speech—that is, speech which
does nothing more than propose a commercial transaction.80 Thus, to
invoke the First Amendment as a defense to publicity-claim liability, the
defendant need not establish that the challenged use meets or is similar to
one of the statutorily enumerated copyright fair use illustrations (e.g.,
criticism, comment, news reporting, etc.). Rather, and more simply, the
defendant need only show that the challenged use is transformative and
does not implicate the narrow category of core commercial speech,
specially interpreted under the First Amendment speech doctrine.81 Stated
otherwise, it is easier for a publicity-claim defendant to avoid liability by
proving that the challenged depiction is more than a bare invitation to a
commercial transaction than it is for a copyright infringement defendant to
avoid liability by proving that the challenged secondary use meets or is
76. See Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liech. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672
F.2d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1982) (restating “the general rule that ‘[c]onflicts between interests
protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment and the copyright laws thus far have been resolved by
application of the fair use doctrine’” (quoting Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript
Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977))).
77. See Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing the
transformative use test as a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
79. See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1997)
(noting “that the District Court gave no explicit consideration to whether the defendants’ use
was within any of the categories that the preamble to section 107 identifies as illustrative of a
fair use, or even whether it was similar to such categories”).
80. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
81. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001).

2016]

A COPYRIGHT RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

2819

equivalent to one of the statutorily enumerated purposes, such as news
reporting.
To better isolate the subtle but significant distinction between these
speech-based affirmative defenses, a contrast that may be more readily
discernable in application than recitation, consider the following two
counterpoised examples that illustrate differences in the categorical breadth
of liability exemptions and resulting outcomes under the two standards.
(1) Copyright fair use defense—Roy Export Co. v. CBS82: In a 1977
public broadcast, the national CBS network televised a biographical
film retrospective shortly after the death of legendary screen actor
The retrospective contained unlicensed
Charlie Chaplin.83
copyrighted excerpts from Chaplin’s films, and, when sued for
infringement by the films’ copyright holders, CBS argued that the
First Amendment protected its unauthorized use for the exempt
purpose of news reporting.84 The Second Circuit, affirming the
jury’s verdict of copyright infringement against CBS, held that the
First Amendment’s protection for unauthorized use of copyrighted
work is limited to the fair use doctrine, and, because CBS could not
prove that its use of the film excerpts was necessary for the purpose
of news reporting, its commercial broadcast incorporating the
copyrighted excerpts did not constitute fair use.85
(2) First Amendment publicity rights defense—Mitchell v. Cartoon
Network86: In 2015, Billy Mitchell, a personality well-known in
video gaming communities, brought a publicity rights claim against
Cartoon Network, a basic cable television network, for its depiction
of an animated character resembling Mitchell in a commercially
broadcast televised cartoon featuring a scene involving a video game
contest.87 Invoking the First Amendment directly as an affirmative
defense, Cartoon Network argued that its depiction was sufficiently
transformative to avoid liability under Mitchell’s publicity-right
claim.88 The federal district court in New Jersey granted Cartoon
Network’s motion to dismiss, observing that “[t]he First Amendment
protects freedom of expression in entertainment”89 and that, as a
matter of law, the animated depiction was sufficiently transformative
for the First Amendment to override Mitchell’s state-law publicityrights claim.90
Comparison of these cases brings into sharper relief differences in the
categorical scope of the more restrictive copyright fair use affirmative
defense and the broader First Amendment affirmative defense to publicity
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id.
Civ. No. 15-5668, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157737, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2015).
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *18.
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claim liability. In Roy Export Co., the court expressly limited CBS’s
defense to the copyright fair use doctrine—not the broader First
Amendment speech protection—affirming the jury verdict imposing
copyright infringement liability, because CBS failed to establish that its use
resided within the fair use exemption category of news reporting.91
Notably, the Second Circuit concluded that CBS had failed to establish its
claimed categorical fair use exemption (news reporting) without reaching
an analysis of the copyright fair use balancing test factors, thus
demonstrating the significance of the statutory preamble’s enumeration of
fair use illustrations.92 In Mitchell, by contrast, the Cartoon Network
successfully asserted a First Amendment defense to publicity-claim liability
where the unauthorized depiction of the plaintiff’s identity was used for the
purpose of commercial entertainment.93 This challenged use would seem,
at least arguably if not actually, beyond the more restrictive parameters of
the six copyright fair use exemption illustrations enumerated in § 107’s
statutory preamble.94
A further asymmetry revealed upon comparison of the speech-based
affirmative defenses is a difference in the degree of weight attributed by
courts to the individual balancing factors used to evaluate liabilityexemption claims. Most notably, the defenses differ in the degree of weight
attributed to the challenged use’s economic impact on the market for the
infringed right. Under the copyright fair use doctrine, the fourth fair use
factor requires consideration of “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”95 Courts have given
substantial weight to this factor in the copyright fair use balancing test.
Indeed, in a recent copyright opinion, the Seventh Circuit described this
consideration of economic and market effects as “usually” the “most
important” fair use factor and explained that when a challenged use serves
as a market substitute for the copyrighted work, the factor weighs strongly
against a finding of fair use.96
In the publicity-claim context, by contrast, courts applying First
Amendment speech doctrine appear to attribute comparably less weight to
the challenged depiction’s impact on the market for or value of the asserted
publicity right; instead, courts focus more heavily on the transformativeness
91. Roy Exp. Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982) (“No Circuit that has
considered the question, however, has ever held that the First Amendment provides a
privilege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the ‘fair use’
doctrine.”).
92. See id. at 1100.
93. See Mitchell, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157737, at *17.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
95. Id. § 107(4).
96. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 1555 (2015); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
566 (1985) (stating that the secondary use’s effect on the market for the copyrighted work
“is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”); NIMMER, supra note 74,
§ 13.05 (“If one looks to the fair use cases, if not always to their stated rationale, [the
economic effect on the copyrighted work] emerges as the most important, and indeed,
central fair use factor.”).
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of the secondary use in deciding whether to exempt the defendant from
publicity-claim liability. For example, in Comedy III Products, although
the California Supreme Court acknowledged that courts might occasionally
consider the challenged depiction’s market impact on the value of the
publicity-rights holder’s economic interests, it downplayed the factor by
noting that economic considerations affecting the market for the asserted
publicity right were relevant in only “particularly . . . close cases.”97 The
Comedy III Products court observed that the presence of “significant
transformative elements” generally tends to lessen the depiction’s potential
to interfere with the publicity holder’s economic interests, but the court
stopped short of adopting market impact as an essential factor in its
balancing test.98 In another example discussed above, Hart v. Electronic
Arts,99 the Third Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor
of the defendant video game producer upon finding that the avatar
depictions were insufficiently transformative—and not because the video
game interfered with the economic value of the plaintiffs’ names and
likenesses otherwise protected under the right of publicity.100
Thus, whereas the copyright fair use doctrine generally devotes
substantial weight to evidence of economic interference or adverse market
impact from the challenged use on the copyright holder’s exclusive rights,
courts applying the First Amendment (and transformative use test, in
particular) in the publicity-rights context sometimes consider this factor but
devote comparably lesser weight in balancing the factor against
transformativeness.101 By weighing the economic impact factor differently
under the two balancing tests, the transformative use test more readily
exempts unauthorized persona depictions from publicity-claim liability than
the copyright fair use doctrine exempts unauthorized uses of copyrighted
work from infringement liability. To avoid liability, an unauthorized
copyright user often will have to prove both transformativeness and a lack
of market impact, whereas the unauthorized persona depicter will, in most
circumstances, have to prove only transformativeness. This distinction
between the speech-based affirmative defenses further contributes to the
legal asymmetry favoring copyright holders over publicity-rights holders.
Another source of asymmetry arises from structural features within the
modern marketplace for intellectual property that further widens this
imbalance of treatment. During the twentieth century, the predominant

97. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001). In
Comedy III Products, the California Supreme Court stated that “in determining whether a
work is sufficiently transformative, courts may find useful a subsidiary inquiry, particularly
in close cases: does the marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive
primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted?” Id.
98. Id. at 808.
99. 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
100. Id. at 165–70. The court did, however, note in passing that the lack of
transformation added to the appeal of the video game to users by contributing to the realism
of the game, thus allowing the defendant to capitalize more directly on the plaintiffs’
likenesses. Id. at 168.
101. See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text.
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mode of copyright ownership shifted from individual authors and small
publishers to the large corporate enterprises that now dominate and occupy
a powerful “copyright industry.”102 By contrast, ownership of publicity
rights for living individuals, by and large (although not exclusively103), has
been retained by individual publicity-rights holders themselves. In the
absence of empirical data suggesting otherwise, one would expect corporate
ownership of publicity rights to be rare for living personalities because it is
difficult, if not impossible, for a corporate owner, post-acquisition, to
protect the long-term value of a celebrity’s publicity rights.104 A celebrity’s
sale of publicity rights to a corporate owner, depending on the terms of sale,
should tend to weaken the celebrity’s incentive to maximize the commercial
value of her persona. Worse yet, the sale of publicity rights also allows the
celebrity to externalize the cost of behaving in a manner that diminishes or
eliminates commercial demand for the acquired persona (see, for example,
Tiger Woods).105 By way of anecdotal observation consistent with this
hypothesis, it is unsurprising that a review of the client roster of CMG
Worldwide, one of the largest corporate owners of publicity rights, reveals
that CMG manages the vast majority of its publicity rights portfolio on
behalf of, or acquired from, estates of deceased celebrities; only a small
handful of CMG’s clients are alive, let alone “available for personal
appearances.”106
Diverging ownership trends in the copyright and publicity-rights settings
are salient because these differences in modes of ownership may
asymmetrically affect a copyright holder’s willingness to assume litigation
and liability risk from a publicity claim as compared to a celebrity’s
willingness to assume litigation and liability risk from a copyright
infringement claim. Admittedly, the individuals most likely to assert a
publicity claim are often celebrities who possess an enviable quantum of
wealth and enjoy a comfortable station in life. But corporate conglomerate
102. See NETANEL, supra note 7, at 92–93 (“Today’s ‘copyright industries’—publishers,
motion picture studios, and record labels—are, for the most part, large business concerns,
typically under the roof of global media and entertainment conglomerates. Those copyrightsupported commercial mass media enjoy an agenda-setting power rivaling that of public
officials.”).
103. In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., the court noted that “Plaintiff–Appellant
ETW Corporation (‘ETW’) is the licensing agent of Eldrick ‘Tiger’ Woods (‘Woods’), one
of the world’s most famous professional golfers. Woods, chairman of the board of ETW,
has assigned to it the exclusive right to exploit his name, image, likeness, and signature, and
all other publicity rights.” 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003). The corporate licensing of
publicity rights by Tiger Woods, however, involves the transfer of rights to a corporate
entity, but not a disinterested third party. ETW was a closely held corporation controlled by
Tiger Woods, and, until 2009, Woods was its sole shareholder. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 221 n.172 (2012).
104. See Rothman, supra note 103, at 227.
105. See id. Tiger Woods, whose persona soared in commercial value at the height of his
golfing career but was later beset by scandal involving his self-proclaimed “sex addiction,”
exemplifies the risk inherent in acquiring publicity rights from living personalities. Id. at
221.
106. See Clients, CMG WORLDWIDE, http://www.cmgworldwide.com/clients/clientList/
Printed_Client_List_Domestic.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [http://perma.cc/ZN9ETY33].
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copyright holders are in most cases so vastly and comparatively richer in
assets and economic power that the mere possibility of a copyright
infringement suit against an individual celebrity, regardless of the potential
viability of her fair use defense, is likely to have a chilling effect on
experimental use of copyrighted work: one would expect the personality’s
fear of triggering cost-prohibitive, if not vexatious, litigation brought by a
large corporate copyright owner might deter celebrities from using a
copyrighted depiction of herself in reliance on the fair use doctrine.
Holding constant the merits of any given copyright infringement or
publicity claim, in a litigation war of attrition between an individual
celebrity and a corporation, the outsized resources available to an
aggressive corporate litigant often will pose an untenably expensive risk
even for wealthy celebrities because the downside exposure of subjecting
personal assets to litigation costs and a potential liability judgment may
present too great a risk in return for the celebrity’s attempted fair use of
copyrighted work.
By contrast, corporate copyright owners, even though often sensitive to
risk management concerns, are comparatively less likely to be deterred by
the cost of asserting or defending litigation or incurring a potential liability
judgment from an unauthorized celebrity depiction because of their
disproportionately superior economic position. The limited liability
protection for individual corporate managers arising from the corporate
form should further diminish the risk sensitivity of corporate intellectual
property owners. Unlike celebrities who generally sue and respond to
lawsuits in an individual capacity, corporate managers who decide whether
to initiate copyright litigation or whether to permit the corporation’s
unauthorized use of a celebrity depiction at the risk of publicity-claim
liability generally do not make such decisions at the risk of exposing their
own personal assets to the cost of litigation or a liability judgment.
Given this imbalance in the treatment of publicity-rights holders and
copyright holders, Part II discusses whether the Constitution may provide a
basis for tempering the asymmetry by providing greater protection for the
speech and autonomy interests of publicity-rights holders to use their own
depictions embodied in a copyrighted work owned by someone else.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
This part examines two constitutional considerations implicated by the
burden of copyright law on publicity-rights holders: (1) First Amendment
principles and the tendency of copyright law to inhibit the publicity-rights
holder’s speech in relation to the copyrighted depiction; and (2) substantive
due process principles and the burden imposed by copyright law on the
publicity-rights holder’s identity-based liberty interest in using the
copyrighted depiction. Upon surveying these considerations, I conclude
that, although there are compelling constitutional considerations favoring
the publicity-rights holder, any path toward copyright reform in this context
might best be achieved through legal principles that draw upon, but do not
directly invoke, constitutional doctrine.
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A. Copyright Burden on the
Publicity-Rights Holder’s Speech Interests
An important line of scholarship has examined the extent to which
publicity rights abridge the First Amendment right of authors seeking to use
or incorporate celebrity personae in creative works of expression.107 In this
section, I consider the next (and inverse) iteration of this inquiry: Under
what circumstances, if any, should the personality’s First Amendment right
to engage in speech about himself prevail over the author’s interest in
enforcing a copyright for a work (or portion of a work) depicting the
personality’s name or likeness?
For purposes of this inquiry, I accept as settled that the First Amendment
cabins publicity rights by allowing authors to engage in creative works of
expression incorporating a transformed use of the personality’s name or
image. I am not concerned here with questions about whether the First
Amendment goes too far108 or not far enough109 in limiting the publicityrights holder’s ability to control or profit from transformative uses of his
name or image. Rather, I limit my discussion to the personality’s right, free
from the specter of an injunction order and infringement liability, to engage
in speech about his own persona as depicted in a copyrighted work. In
other words, does the First Amendment permit a copyright holder to enjoin
a personality from engaging in speech and expression about himself where
the personality’s name or likeness is embodied in the copyrighted work, and
how, if at all, is the commercial nature of the personality’s use of the
copyrighted depiction relevant?
The First Amendment conflict between copyright and speech rights has
concerned scholars for decades because the exclusionary rights conferred
by copyright law necessarily curtail the speech rights of would-be infringers
seeking to use a copyrighted work for speech-related purposes.110 In
107. See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 65, at 7 (criticizing the right of publicity for lacking
mechanisms to protect First Amendment values and for inadequately protecting speech by
relying on transformativeness); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 134 (1993) (arguing that
“publicity rights exact a higher cost in important competing values (notably, free expression
and cultural pluralism) than has generally been appreciated”).
108. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First
Amendment, and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1345 (2009) (arguing that the right
to self-expression and identity should prevail over the First Amendment right to appropriate
a personality when injury is inflicted upon the dignity interests of the individual whose
identity was appropriated).
109. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask That Eats into the Face: Images and the Right
of Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 206 (2015) (arguing that the speech protection
against publicity claim liability is too narrow and “allows the suppression of substantial
amounts of non-advertising speech”).
110. As Professor Nimmer explained:
The [F]irst [A]mendment tells us that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Does not the Copyright Act fly directly in
the face of that command? Is it not precisely a “law” made by Congress which
abridges the “freedom of speech” and “of the press” in that it punishes expressions
by speech and press when such expressions consist of the unauthorized use of
material protected by copyright? But surely, many will conclude, the [F]irst
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grappling with this tension, courts have construed copyright law’s
protection of authors who invest time and resources in developing creative
work not as an end in itself, but as instrumental in promoting the public’s
enjoyment of creative labor.111 This construct implicitly acknowledges that
the method chosen by Congress for protecting the author’s economic stake
in creative labor has a speech-inhibiting effect of regulating expression by
others (i.e., would-be infringers) seeking use of the copyrighted work
As the scope, duration, and
without permission or payment.112
technological protection of copyright has grown dramatically since the
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, scholars have become increasingly
critical of the expansion of copyright law as overly burdensome of
speech.113
Partially mitigating the tension between speech and copyright protection,
the copyright fair use doctrine is considered a First Amendment safeguard
because it permits limited use of copyrighted work without infringement
liability.114 In theory, the fair use doctrine’s transformative use test should
protect the copier’s freedom of expression by immunizing uses that
creatively repurpose the original copyrighted work,115 but, in the conflict
between publicity- and authorial-rights holders, the fair use doctrine does
not live up to its promise as a free speech safeguard.
First, as noted above, it is more difficult to assert the affirmative defense
of copyright fair use than the First Amendment defense, and copyright
ownership now is dominated by a formidable copyright industry with vastly
greater economic and market power compared to that of publicity-rights
holders. An author is therefore more likely willing to rely on the
transformative use test at the risk of infringing publicity rights than a
publicity-rights holder is willing to rely on the fair use doctrine at the risk
of infringing a copyright. The economic resources of large copyright
owners render them more suitably situated to assume the risk and expense
[A]mendment does not apply to copyright infringers. Yet, is such a conclusion
justified?
Nimmer, supra note 46, at 1181; see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 988 (1970).
111. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good. ‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly,’ this Court has said, ‘lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors.’” (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))); Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
112. Interestingly, the right of publicity, rationalized on grounds similar to copyright law,
itself has been criticized for imposing unreasonable burdens on speech interests and the
public’s interest in cultural pluralism and self-determination. See, e.g., Madow, supra note
107; Tushnet, supra note 109.
113. See, e.g., NETANEL, supra note 7, at 54–80 (cataloging and critiquing “copyright’s
ungainly expansion”); Benkler, supra note 7, at 446 (criticizing copyright’s regulation of
information); Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 5 (arguing “that copyright’s prohibition of
unauthorized derivative works is unconstitutional”).
114. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (describing the fair use
doctrine as a “built-in First Amendment accommodation[]”).
115. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 55, at 1111.
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of protracted infringement litigation than publicity-rights holders. The net
effect of differences in the affirmative defenses and the disparity of market
power serves to facilitate copyright holders in making transformative uses
of personality depictions, while deterring personalities from attempting
transformative uses of copyrighted works containing their own depictions.
Second, the copyright fair use doctrine does not provide relief for most
forms of nontransformative copying, even when such copying furthers
legitimate First Amendment speech objectives. Professor Rebecca Tushnet,
for example, convincingly argues that copyright law constrains important
speech-enhancing forms of nontransformative copying that would otherwise
advance First Amendment goals of self-expression, persuasion, and
affirmation.116 Professor Tushnet’s critique of copyright law argues against
intellectual property constraints on the right to use copyrighted work when
engaging in noncommercial acts of self-definition and participation in
cultural phenomena embodied in a copyrighted work.117 For example,
when individuals engage with copyrighted work by reciting poetry,
performing a musical composition, or putting on a play, their engagement
with the copyrighted work almost always involves nontransformative
copying under the current fair use doctrine. However, the act of staging
someone else’s work can be fundamentally self-expressive through the
reflection and manifestation of important qualities of the copier’s
personality.118 Nontransformative copying also can play an important role
in allowing the speaker to use the words of someone else for the purpose of
Tushnet argues that the speech-enhancing value of
affirmation.119
nontransformative copying warrants broadening the fair use doctrine to
permit certain forms of copying and an expansion of compulsory licensing
of copyrighted work.120
On this matter of nontransformative copying, by way of brief digression,
I note that speech constraints imposed by copyright law may not be entirely
inconsistent with the goal of promoting creative expression. In an
interesting recent corollary to Professor Tushnet’s theory favoring a more
expansive right to copy, Professor Joseph Fishman argues that,

116. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 562–82.
117. Id. at 564.
118. Id. at 568–74 (“Symphony patrons debate the merits of one recording of the same
piece over another because, although each copies the same musical work, the performances
differ in ways both subtle and overt. Recordings can even spark political controversy: Peter
Breiner’s 1994 arrangement of The Star-Spangled Banner, which was used at the Athens
Olympics, has been interpreted as a ‘blue-state’ version of the anthem, full of ‘nuance’ and
‘local variation and possibility’ as compared to the traditional arrangements that emphasize
‘primary colors’ and more aggressive music. Musicians fill concert venues because fans
enjoy live performances of the same musical works they can hear at home. Each new
performance produces a different effect on the audience because each one represents the
artist’s self-expression; the copy bears the unique marks of its copying.”).
119. See id. at 568 (“We would probably accept, for example, the proposition that all
fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence adopted the words as their own—and it
was thereby a more powerful document than a collection of fifty-six different explanations
of the colonies’ plight.”).
120. Id. at 589.
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“paradoxically,” restrictions on copying often yield more creativity, not
less, because the copyright prohibition requires would-be copiers to
innovate and engage in creative processes to avoid infringement.121 But
Professor Fishman’s observations about the tendency of copyright
constraints to spawn creative noninfringing uses may fall short of
answering critics, like Tushnet, who contend that the First Amendment
protects the right to engage in nontransformative uses of copyrighted work.
On that point, Professor Fishman expressly demurs.122 Tushnet, for
example, contends that copyright restrictions on nontransformative copying
may result in distortion of the secondary user’s message rather than new
creativity, thereby harming not only the speaker’s interest in free speech but
also the audience for creative works.123
Drawing on Professor Fishman’s model of the creative upside of
copyright constraints, one might argue that the fair use doctrine already
allows a personality to use a copyrighted depiction of himself, provided that
he engages in further transformation of the depiction. But, in addition to
the affirmative-defense differences and speech-chilling effects of the market
power disparity noted above, the personality’s right to engage in
transformative use of the copyrighted depiction does not address Professor
Tushnet’s persuasive argument that the First Amendment should also
protect nontransformative copying as inherently valuable self-expressive
speech:
Copying can serve as self-expression, using the most apt words to explain
and define beliefs and thoughts; it can assist persuasion, using the best
words to reach a particular audience; and it can work as affirmation, a
way of connecting to a larger group. Many uses serve more than one of
those functions.124

Thus, Tushnet argues that the First Amendment provides a basis for
protecting self-expressive speech notwithstanding its nontransformative use
of copyrighted work. She contends that nontransformative copying is
necessary to preserve a level of free expression conducive to preserving a
“democratic culture” in which “everyone will have the resources to

121. Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336–37
(2015) (arguing that creativity “thrives best not under complete freedom, but rather under a
moderate amount of restriction”).
122. Id. at 1335 n.4 (declining to address “the rights-based argument that the First
Amendment entitles downstream creators the liberty to express themselves using elements of
others’ copyrighted works”).
123. Professor Tushnet describes such an example:
For example, Who Built America? is an award-winning historical CD-ROM series
for high school and college students that uses numerous primary sources. Owners
of the sources’ copyrights often wanted large payments for use of historically
significant works, payments the authors couldn’t afford. They substituted federal
government and public domain works, altering the way students will understand
the past; the materials now overemphasize the federal government’s role in
Depression-era society and culture.
Tushnet, supra note 7, at 565–66.
124. Id. at 566–67.
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participate in culture and the freedom to debate and disagree about
meaning.”125
Tushnet’s theory of nontransformative copying would seem to support an
even stronger First Amendment case for protecting self-expressive speech
where the copyrighted work contains a depiction of the would-be copyright
infringer’s own identity.
If we ascribe constitutional value to
nontransformative copying for the purpose of self-expression, then,
arguably, we should ascribe even greater constitutional value to the
speaker’s use of his own depiction in a copyrighted work to engage in selfexpression. To frame this assertion more concretely, if Professor Weisbord
has a First Amendment right to copy or use the song “What Would Brian
Boitano Do?” in self-expressive speech, then would Mr. Boitano not have a
stronger claim to copy or use “What Would Brian Boitano Do?” in selfexpressive speech about his own depiction? Given the song’s depiction,
who would have greater authority or interest in discussing the meaning and
cultural implications of “What Would Brian Boitano Do?” than Brian
Boitano himself? The depicted personality’s free speech interest in using
the copyrighted depiction would seem especially salient given the copyright
holder’s right to seek injunctive relief as a remedy for copyright
infringement because a court-ordered injunction against the personality’s
use of his own depiction would create the constitutionally tenuous scenario
of prohibiting the personality from engaging in speech about himself.126
An identity-based First Amendment distinction, if accepted by courts,
might provide support for allowing a personality to use a copyrighted
depiction of himself while denying other persons a speech-based copyright
exemption to use the depiction without a license. The scholarly literature
contains occasional support for identity-based distinctions under the First
Amendment. For example, Professor Edwin Baker argued that the First
Amendment protects an identity-based autonomy interest in selfAccording to Professor Baker, the need to protect
expression.127
fundamental human values associated with speech implied a rationale for
drawing an identity-based distinction between actual human beings, who
have a direct individual interest in autonomy, and press-promoting
institutional corporate entities that exercise speech rights instrumentally in
service of free-press goals but not as a “direct human value.”128 And
indeed, there are contexts in which the First Amendment has been
construed to permit distinctions based on the speaker’s identity. For
example, under the Hatch Act, certain federal employees are prohibited
125. Id. at 539–40.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012) (authorizing injunctive relief as a remedy for copyright
infringement); see also, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227
F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Even an author who had disavowed any intention to
publish his work during his lifetime was entitled to protection of his copyright, first, because
the relevant consideration was the ‘potential market’ and, second, because he has the right to
change his mind.” (citing Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987))).
127. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 897
(2002).
128. Id. at 898.
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from engaging in political activities while on duty,129 a prohibition the
Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional.130
Courts, however, have not fully embraced identity-based distinctions
under the First Amendment.131 In Citizens United v. FEC,132 albeit in a
different context, the Supreme Court held that First Amendment speech
principles do not turn on the speaker’s identity.133 Citizens United does not
directly address the particular speech interests at stake here, but a First
Amendment analysis that would treat the personality differently from other
potential speakers would seem at least inconsistent with the principle that
“the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker’s corporate identity.”134
Assuming for the moment that there is a personal First Amendment
interest in using one’s own depiction in a copyrighted work, how, if at all,
does the commercial use of the copyrighted depiction alter the equation?
Some scholarship suggests that nontransformative uses of copyrighted work
should be confined to noncommercial settings. For example, in Professor
Jessica Litman’s influential work on “personal use” exemptions from
copyright enforcement,135 she argues that “reading, listening, viewing,
watching, playing, and using copyrighted works is at the core of the
copyright system,”136 so such uses should not trigger copyright enforcement
mechanisms for infringement where the use is “private, noncommercial, or
incidental [to other lawful uses].”137 In contrast, she contends that
“[p]ersonal uses that are public, that are commercial, or that compete with
copyright owner exploitation seem like attractive candidates to bring within
the realm of copyright owner control” because those uses tend to undermine
the incentive for authors to engage in creative labor.138 Tushnet, in her
model of nontransformative copying, agrees with Litman in drawing a
distinction between commercial and noncommercial uses.139 These
proposed limitations on fair use of copyrighted work for commercial

129. See 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2012).
130. See United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 103 (1947).
131. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 463, 469 (2010) (“One possible reason for this failure [of courts to
recognize identity-based distinctions] is that the broad claim of a general right to selfexpression does not provide a basis for distinguishing or limiting uses, making use claims
more easily dismissed.”).
132. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
133. Id. at 365.
134. Id.
135. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879 (2007)
(arguing that copyright law is too protective of authorial rights because it fails to properly
account for and allow personal use of copyrighted work).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1918.
138. Id.
139. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 587 (noting that “the law might exempt noncommercial or
at least small-scale noncommercial copying (private use) along with transformative uses”).
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purposes are consistent with the doctrine’s general preference for
noncommercial and nonprofit uses.140
A categorical limitation prohibiting commercial secondary usage,
however, is not required under the current fair use standard. The Supreme
Court considered and expressly rejected the contention that commerciality,
standing alone, should be entitled to a presumptive finding against fair use
because most instances of copyright fair use, including most of the
enumerated illustrations in § 107’s statutory preamble, involve profitseeking activities.141 Rather, courts apply the doctrine’s preference against
commercial use dynamically by weighing commerciality against other
factors, in particular, the transformative nature of the challenged use.142
Courts often balance the degree of transformativeness against
commerciality because the unauthorized commercial sale of copyrighted
material, devoid of any showing of transformation, begins to resemble
outright theft of intellectual property for which the copyright holder has a
legal right to demand a price.143 Indeed, an overly broad interpretation of
fair use to permit reproduction of copyrighted work for the pure purpose of
commercial exploitation would undermine the entire premise of copyright
protection.
Here, it may be possible to interpret the current fair use doctrine in a way
that accommodates a First Amendment interest in nontransformative
copying even where the copyrighted material is used for a commercial
purpose. Such an interpretation might give greater weight and salience to
the second fair use factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,”144 to offset
the publicity-rights holder’s commercial use of the copyrighted depiction.
When the First Amendment curtails publicity claims to protect the author’s
freedom of expression, it does so notwithstanding the author’s right to sell
140. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107(1), (4) (2012); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use.”).
141. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (“If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force
against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative
uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment,
criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities ‘are generally conducted
for profit in this country.’” (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471
U.S. 539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
142. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘[T]he more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.’ Although there is no question
that Prince’s artworks are commercial, we do not place much significance on that fact due to
the transformative nature of the work.” (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584)).
143. Cf. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 562 (“The crux of the
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.”); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d
Cir. 1994) (“[C]ourts will not sustain a claimed defense of fair use when the secondary use
can fairly be characterized as a form of ‘commercial exploitation,’ i.e., when the copier
directly and exclusively acquires conspicuous financial rewards from its use of the
copyrighted material.”).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
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for profit the work containing the personality’s unauthorized depiction.145
If, under Tushnet’s framework, the First Amendment should be construed
to protect the personality’s self-expressive right to engage in
nontransformative copying of his own depiction in a copyrighted work, why
should the personality’s use of the copyrighted depiction be limited to
private noncommercial settings when the author’s creation of the work
depicting the persona was not similarly limited? If there is a First
Amendment basis for protecting the speech-enhancing benefits generated
by the personality’s nontransformative use of his own depiction in a
copyrighted work, then it would seem constitutionally anomalous (or, at
least inconsistent) to deny those speech-enhancing benefits simply because
the personality’s nontransformative use might return a profit.
There may be compelling speech-based justifications for protecting the
right of personalities to use their own depiction in a copyrighted work, but
as a practical matter, prospects appear inauspicious for convincing courts
that the First Amendment requires a special copyright exemption in this
context. Although the Supreme Court rejected the notion that copyright law
is categorically immune from First Amendment scrutiny in a recent First
Amendment challenge to statutory extension of the copyright term,146
Professor Neil Netanel observes that “the [Supreme] Court [has] almost
entirely closed the door on further First Amendment challenges to
traditional copyright law.”147 Writing for a 7-2 majority in Eldred v.
Ashcroft,148 Justice Ginsburg observed, “The First Amendment securely
protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it
bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s
speeches.”149 In summarizing the First Amendment jurisprudence in this
area, Professor Jennifer Rothman identifies three synthesizing reasons for
why courts generally have declined to construe the First Amendment as a
defense to copyright enforcement:
First, the constitutional speech
protection is not absolute and is therefore subject to numerous exceptions,
copyright among them.150 Second, copyright law both embodies speechprotective features and, as an engine of free expression, furthers First
Amendment objectives.151 Third, courts tend to view copyright piracy as
misappropriation rather than a form of self-expression.152
On balance, therefore, although the publicity-rights holder’s interest in
using a copyrighted depiction of himself implicates important and
legitimate speech interests that warrant protection, it does not appear that

145. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“That books,
newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from
being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”).
146. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
147. NETANEL, supra note 7, at 172.
148. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
149. Id. at 221.
150. See Rothman, supra note 131, at 480–81.
151. See id. at 484.
152. See id. at 485.
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the First Amendment itself would provide the most suitable source of law
on which to base recognition of such a right.
B. Copyright Burden on the
Publicity-Rights Holder’s Liberty Interests
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to protect, implicitly,
certain dignity and autonomy interests in defining one’s personal identity as
a matter of substantive due process.153 This section considers whether this
liberty interest should be extended to protect the innately human need for
individual autonomy and dignity associated with controlling one’s own
identity as depicted in a copyrighted work. Ultimately, however, while
intrigued by recent scholarship in this area, I conclude that treating the
publicity-rights holder’s copyright exemption as a fundamental right for
purposes of substantive due process would attempt to stretch constitutional
doctrine protecting liberty interests beyond the realm of judicial credulity.
In Rothman’s recent work in this area, she argues that, because First
Amendment challenges to the overbreadth of copyright law have been
largely unsuccessful, courts should consider grounding an exemption for
“[i]dentity-based uses of copyrighted works . . . integral to constructing
personal identity” in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection of
liberty and substantive due process.154 According to Rothman, “[A] liberty
analysis demonstrates that one should have a right to use someone else’s
copyrighted work to engage with one’s own-lived experiences”155 because
“[t]he zones of rights considered fundamental in a substantive due process
analysis center on issues of identity and personhood.”156 As Rothman
explains:
Identity at its heart revolves around our sense of self and our ability to
define and situate ourselves in the world around us—it includes our
understanding of ourselves both individually and in the context of the
broader sociocultural groups to which we belong. At a minimum, our
identity is composed of our life history, important life-changing or
psychologically altering experiences, and our beliefs and values. Each

153. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (finding that substantive due
process protects “liberties extend[ing] to certain personal choices central to individual
dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs”);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“[O]ur laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (observing that the Bill of Rights contains penumbras
that form a zone of privacy).
154. Rothman, supra note 131, at 465. Consistent with her position on the identity-based
liberty interest in using copyrighted work, Professor Rothman argues elsewhere that the right
of publicity is also identity based and should therefore not be freely alienable. See generally
Rothman, supra note 103.
155. Rothman, supra note 131, at 475.
156. Id. at 495.

2016]

A COPYRIGHT RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

2833

person’s life, both past and present, is not only intertwined with
copyrighted materials but constructed with these copyrighted works.
....
Our memories, life experiences, and cultural and religious ties are often
bound up with copyrighted works.157

Rothman argues that when an individual forms or perceives a deep
connection to a copyrighted work, the law should recognize the individual’s
right to “inhabit” the work free from infringement liability:
Each of us interacts with and “inhabits” copyrighted works.
Sometimes a story that we read is affecting, . . . and sometimes that story
becomes so interwoven with our own lives that it is difficult to describe or
engage with our own lives without reference to that story. . . . When
copyrighted works enter an individual’s world they sometimes become so
intertwined with that person’s identity that to deny the use of that work
would seriously impair that person’s ability to control her own “destiny.”
....
Copyrighted works play a crucial constitutive role in constructing our
identities, and the degree of our personal entanglements with such works
should determine how much latitude we should have to use those
works.158

Under Rothman’s creative and innovative proposal, substantive due process
would require an exemption from copyright enforcement whenever the
secondary use implicates the user’s right to mental integrity, intimate
relations, connection to a cultural or linguistic artifact, or right to practice
religion.159 Rothman describes several applications of her theory, one of
which involves a celebrity’s identity-based liberty interest in blogging about
and posting a copyrighted photograph of herself without a license from the
photograph’s copyright holder.160
A liberty interest in this context might also find support in a related line
of scholarship advocating for a “personhood” theory of property, in which
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 496–98.
Id. at 498–500.
Id. at 514–28.
Professor Rothman explains:
Consider Samantha Ronson’s posting to her MySpace page of the photograph
of her and her girlfriend kissing at a party. Ronson violated the photographer’s
copyright by posting the picture to her MySpace page if she did so without
permission. Neither the fair use doctrine nor the First Amendment provides
Ronson a dependable defense, but a liberty-interest approach establishes Ronson’s
right to post a picture documenting her own life on her own webpage even if she
was not the one who took the photograph. This is true in part for the reasons set
forth [earlier]—Ronson’s mental integrity demands her ability to accurately
describe her experiences (in this case both that she was at the event and that a
photograph was taken of her, a fact that she might wish to comment on for its
intrusiveness into a personal moment). The photograph is also intimacy
promoting—she may have posted it to show her then-girlfriend Lindsey Lohan
how important she was to Ronson, how important the moment itself was, or
perhaps to share her affection for Lohan with her friends. Such intimacy-driven
uses of copyrighted works deserve robust constitutional protection from
infringement actions.
Id. at 521–22.
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proponents argue that the law should recognize a person’s constitutive need
to establish connections to the external world in which the person lives.161
This scholarship invokes the philosophical work of Hegel, who observed
that the need for actualization of the individual implies a right of persons to
exercise control over material objects in his external world.162 Professor
John Tehranian explains:
Formation of personhood takes place internally as an individual’s identity
is shaped through interaction with objects in the external world.
Meanwhile, the expression of personhood occurs when the individual
communicates some aspect of her (already formed) identity to others as a
way of contextualizing herself, through her relationship with objects,
within the broader community.
Individual consumption of property therefore serves as a powerful tool
for both identity formation and expression.163

Tehranian cites this strand of philosophy to critique the growing role of
copyright law in regulating private use and possession of intellectual
property, and copyrighted material in particular.164 He argues further that
expansion of copyright protection adversely affects “the formation and
expression of cultural and nationalistic identities.”165 If, under the
personhood theory of property, a person is deemed to acquire property
interests by consuming and appropriating elements of intellectual property
with which he personally identifies, then it seems to follow that such an
interest would be most salient with respect to the use of intellectual
property that appropriates the individual’s own identity.
Recognition of a substantive due process right to control one’s own
identity and personhood likely would have met the approval of Professor
Bloustein who, as noted in Part I.A, argued that privacy is an essential
aspect of human dignity and requires that a person retain the right to decide
when, and at what price, to abandon it.166 Under this rationale, depriving a
person of the right to decide when and under what conditions to abandon
161. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960
(1982) (“Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external ‘thing’ in some
constitutive sense, we can argue that by virtue of this connection the person should be
accorded broad liberty with respect to control over that ‘thing.’”).
162. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶ 44, at 41 (T.M. Knox
trans., Clarendon Press 1952) (1821) (“A person has as his substantive end the right of
putting his will into any and every thing and thereby making it his, because it has no such
end in itself and derives its destiny and soul from his will. This is the absolute right of
appropriation which man has over all ‘things.’”).
163. John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity
Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 83. Professor Tehranian notes that his proposals for copyright reform, based
on the personhood theory of property, are confined to the four corners of copyright law and
do not rely on a constitutional basis for copyright exemption. Id. at 19.
166. Bloustein, supra note 35, at 989 (“[A person’s] name and likeness can only begin to
command a commercial price in a society which recognizes that there is a right to privacy, a
right to control the conditions under which name and likeness may be used. Property
becomes a commodity subject to be bought and sold only where the community will enforce
an individual’s right to maintain use and possession of it as against the world.”).
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privacy would represent an involuntary commodification of the person’s
identity, an outcome inconsistent with respect for human dignity. Bloustein
explained:
Every man has a right to prevent the commercial exploitation of his
personality, not because of its commercial worth, but because it would be
demeaning to human dignity to fail to enforce such a right.
....
As I view the matter, using a person’s name or likeness for a commercial
purpose without consent is a wrongful exercise of dominion over another
even though there is no subjective sense of having been wronged, even, in
fact, if the wrong was subjectively appreciated, and even though a
commercial profit might accrue as a result. This is so because the wrong
involved is the objective diminution of personal freedom rather than the
infliction of personal suffering or the misappropriation of property.167

For these reasons, Bloustein recharacterized the right of publicity as a
limited right “to command a commercial price for abandoning privacy.”168
Echoing Professor Bloustein’s call for respecting human dignity, Professor
Daniel Solove more recently characterized the appropriation of one’s
persona without consent as “exploitation.”169 These arguments, however,
apart from suggesting a copyright exemption on substantive due process
grounds, might instead augur for lesser First Amendment protection for an
author’s unauthorized use of a personality’s name and likeness.170
167. Id. at 989–90.
168. Id. at 989.
169. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 549 (2006).
Professor Solove explains:
The interest safeguarded by protections against appropriation is control of the way
one presents oneself to society. The products and causes people publicly endorse
shape their public image. When people are associated with products, they become
known in terms of these products. Many public figures take great care with their
endorsements because these endorsements shape their public image. Thus,
appropriation can be harmful even if it is not humiliating, degrading, or
disrespectful. Being unwillingly used to endorse a product resembles, in certain
respects, being compelled to speak and to represent certain viewpoints.
Protection against appropriation establishes what society considers appropriate
for others to do in shaping a person’s identity. The harm, then, is an impingement
on the victim’s freedom in the authorship of her self-narrative, not merely her loss
of profits.
Id. at 548–49.
170. In resituating publicity rights within the framework of liberty and privacy,
comparative law considerations might offer helpful guidance. In Germany, for example,
where the history of Nazi subjugation of individuality, self-determination, and autonomy
greatly influenced its post-World War II legal system, the German Basic Law explicitly
protects human dignity interests, including respect for individuals as independent
personalities. See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the
German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?,
98 CAL. L. REV. 1925, 1948 (2010). The extension of these dignity-based principles in
Germany has led to a different formulation of protection for publicity rights compared to the
protections offered by American law. On the one hand, Germany recognizes a far broader
newsworthy exception to publicity rights, which, as a result, facilitates broader commercial
use of celebrity depictions. Id. at 1971. On the other hand, in contexts where the
newsworthy exception does not apply, German law is generally more protective of publicity
rights on privacy grounds. Id. at 1974 (“Nonetheless, even celebrities in Germany can enjoy
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While a theory of identity-based substantive due process rights is
intriguing, and, in the abstract, the idea that individuals might have a liberty
or autonomy interest in constructing their own identities through the use of
copyrighted depictions of themselves is appealing, I have reservations about
the potentially unwieldy breadth of such a broad framework for copyright
exemption. Rothman, herself, has noted this concern.171 My particular
reservations are two-fold: First, the Supreme Court is less likely to
recognize a substantive due process right in the absence of evidence that the
right in question is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”172
Although Rothman points out that copyright law is, itself, founded on a
constitutional provision predating the First Amendment, a liberty interest in
using copyrighted work as expansively as she posits likely will encounter
judicial skepticism.173 At bottom, a right to inhabit copyrighted work based
on one’s personal connection to the work would not appear to rise in stature
or importance to other fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme
Court, such as same-sex marriage, abortion, or contraception.
Second, in perhaps a more basic critique of this theory, a framework for
copyright exemption based on the user’s self-proclaimed assertion about his
personal connection to the copyrighted work seems to lack a governable
limiting principle. Rothman acknowledges that “[c]ourts will need to
carefully evaluate the facts of a specific case to confirm that a defendant is
not pretending to attach some important personal meaning when there is
none,” though she also argues that “[s]uch determinations of motive are
made elsewhere in IP cases and throughout the law, and there is no reason
to think they will be any more difficult to make in the context of copyright

the protection of privacy in a public place when there is no newsworthy interest in describing
or photographing the situation and there is a justifiable expectation of being free from
observation.”). Interestingly, under the doctrine of Markenverunglimpfung, German law
even protects the “personality rights” of corporate firms from the disparaging
misappropriation of commercial logos and slogans. See Whitman, supra note 29, at 1210.
Paralleling the modern German view of publicity rights, Professor Alice Haemmerli
observes that Kantian principles also fashion the right of publicity as a “property right
grounded in human autonomy.” Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian
Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 385 (1999).
171. Rothman, supra note 131, at 474 (“I am also concerned that any broad exclusion for
private, noncommercial copying would significantly damage many major commercial
markets given that uses of copyrighted works are increasingly made in private spaces, such
as in homes and dorm rooms, albeit over the arguably public medium of the Internet.”).
172. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); id. at 728 (finding that the purported right to assisted
suicide is not protected by substantive due process, while noting that “[t]he history of the
law’s treatment of assisted suicide . . . has been and continues to be one of the rejection of
nearly all efforts to permit it”); cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015)
(finding that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause, while noting
that “the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution”).
173. See, e.g., Tehranian, supra note 163, at 19–21 (“[I]t is entirely possible (and even
likely) that the judiciary would reject arguments that user rights to copyrighted property are
deeply rooted in our country’s history and tradition[] and involve fundamental liberty
interests on the same grand scale as choices involving abortion, contraception, sexual
conduct, medical treatment, child rearing, and marriage.”).
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cases.”174 Those determinations elsewhere in intellectual property law,
however, are based on a binary inquiry into whether the defendant acted in
good or bad faith.175 It would seem that a test requiring courts to assess
qualitatively the veracity of a defendant’s representations—knowable only
by the defendant—about his association between a copyrighted work and
his sentiments about his own mental integrity, intimacy, culture, or religion
would pose substantial, if not insurmountable, adjudicatory challenges.
The need for a more governable limiting principle might imply that an
identity-based copyright exemption could be limited to circumstances in
which there is an objective manifestation of the identity-based connection,
perhaps on the face of the copyrighted work itself. Rather than relying on
the defendant’s nearly unverifiable assertions about his identity-based use,
the defendant could be required to establish objective proof of his
connection to the copyrighted work. One way of satisfying such an
objective test might be to show that the user’s identity is depicted in the
copyrighted work, thereby establishing a more reliable basis on which to
protect a liberty interest in interacting with and inhabiting a copyrighted
work. But even this form of objective test tenuously presupposes the
willingness of courts to recognize the underlying liberty interest in using
copyrighted work as a fundamental right.
C. Lack of Constitutional Mandate and the
Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance
I appreciate the constitutional dimensions implicated by a personality’s
use of a copyrighted depiction and believe that copyright law encroaches
too far on the personality’s speech and liberty interests in this context. I
acknowledge, however, that the invocation of constitutional doctrine raises
a host of difficult questions about competing rights and interests that, when
taken together, do not point clearly in the direction of mandating such an
exemption as a matter of federal constitutional law. Furthermore, under the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, where possible, courts avoid
construing subconstitutional rules as conflicting with the Constitution
where an alternative interpretation provides adequate legal grounds for
resolving the controversy.176 Here, the availability of alternative grounds
and the attenuated nature of a constitutionally based copyright exemption
174. Rothman, supra note 131, at 530.
175. See id. at 530 n.336 (citing cases involving allegations of bad faith).
176. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 n.24 (2003) (noting that “it is
appropriate to construe copyright’s internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment
concerns” (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (“It
is . . . incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate [serious constitutional] doubts so
long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”))). Professor
Netanel, however, observes that, even if the Constitution does not directly constrain
copyright law, “copyright’s internal safeguards do have constitutional import: even if the
First Amendment imposes no external constraints on copyright, First Amendment principles
must animate our understanding and application of copyright law.” NETANEL, supra note 7,
at 190 (emphasis added).
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would render the doctrine of constitutional avoidance particularly apt.177
Thus, even if aspects of constitutional doctrine could be construed to imply
support for recognizing such a copyright exemption, it would be better
founded on judicial interpretation of, or statutory amendment to, copyright
law rather than on the Constitution itself.
III. A COPYRIGHT RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
A THEORY OF COPYRIGHT EXEMPTION
Although I conclude that the Constitution does not mandate a copyright
exemption for a personality’s use of a copyrighted depiction, I believe the
constitutional considerations described in Part II constitute a compelling
policy justification for recognizing such a right under copyright law. This
part therefore begins to explore ways in which copyright law might be
construed or amended to recognize a limited right of publicity exempting a
personality’s use of a copyrighted depiction of himself from infringement
liability, a novel doctrine which I will refer to as a “copyright right of
publicity.” A carefully delineated copyright right of publicity would
provide greater protection for the speech, liberty, and property interests of
publicity-rights holders, while simultaneously establishing a more
reciprocal relationship under the law between authors and personalities.178
In this part, I seek to present neither a comprehensive nor exhaustive
treatment of the copyright law considerations necessary to implement a
copyright right of publicity; rather, I seek merely to initiate a dialogue about
copyright reform framed within the context of the scholarly critique of
copyright overreach.
Consistent with the constitutional considerations discussed above,179 I
rest the normative foundation for a copyright right of publicity on the
speech, autonomy, and property interests of the publicity-rights holder. I
believe that individuals should have the right to engage in speech and
creative expression about themselves without the possibility of
infringement liability or the speech-chilling specter of expensive copyright
infringement litigation. I believe that individuals have an autonomy interest
in being able to define themselves and their identities as they wish,
including the right to use depictions of themselves embodied in a
copyrighted work. And I believe that, to the extent that a personality’s
property interest in perfecting his publicity rights is curtailed by the First
Amendment, that property interest should not be impaired further by an
application of copyright law that prevents the personality’s use of his own
depiction in a copyrighted work.
177. I acknowledge, however, that scholars have questioned the supposed justification of
courts for invoking the avoidance doctrine. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional
Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 188; Neal
Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and
Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109 (2015).
178. Cf. Guy Pessach, Toward a New Jurisprudence of Copyright Exemptions, 55 IDEA
287, 306 (2015) (arguing that copyright exemptions should be reciprocal).
179. See supra Part II.
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A copyright right of publicity might be most feasibly implemented
through heightened protection under the copyright fair use doctrine.180 For
example, courts might apply an objective test in which an individual’s use
of his own depiction in a copyrighted work would be treated as a
presumptively noninfringing fair use of the copyright. Under this rendition
of fair use, because the “nature of the copyrighted work” embodies a
depiction of the individual’s name or likeness,181 the right of the individual
to use the copyrighted depiction might presumptively be deemed to
outweigh the copyright holder’s interest in the other three fair use
factors.182
My proposal for expanding the fair use doctrine finds support in the
literature on copyright overreach. For example, in the concluding chapter
of his book, Copyright’s Paradox, Professor Netanel develops a
nonconstitutional framework for reining in copyright law’s encroachment
on First Amendment speech rights through fair use reform.183 In particular,
Netanel offers three proposals to promote First Amendment principles and
enhance protective safeguards for speech already embodied in copyright
law.
First, courts could adopt a “First Amendment-animated fair use doctrine”
by relaxing the limitation on secondary uses that “compete[] in an actual or
potential market for derivative works based on the original.”184 Netanel
argues that First Amendment principles suggest that the doctrine’s focus
should be on the transformative use of the secondary work, not the potential
for the secondary work to compete in the market for the original.185 This
proposal would deemphasize the market impact of the secondary use as a
fair use factor, but would retain (indeed, redouble) the restriction of the fair
use defense to transformative works. It would give the personality greater
leeway in making commercial use of the copyrighted depiction, but would
require that the personality further transform the copyrighted depiction.
Second, Netanel proposes that courts apply a burden-shifting standard,
such that, upon establishing a “colorable claim of fair use,” the copyright
holder would bear the burden of proving that the defendant has copied too
much of the original work, or that the use unreasonably impacts the market
for the original work.186 Netanel contends that such a burden-shifting
system would avoid the speech-chilling effect of requiring the accused
infringer to prove a negative, namely, “that the allegedly infringing use—
and other possible uses like it—will not even harm a market, including a
180. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (enumerating the fair use factors).
181. Id. § 107(2).
182. Id. § 107(1) (factor one: “the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”); id. 107(3)
(factor two: “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole”); id. § 107(4) (factor three: “the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work”).
183. See NETANEL, supra note 7, at 195–218.
184. Id. at 191.
185. Id. at 191–92.
186. Id. at 192.
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market for derivative works, that the copyright holder has no concrete plans
to exploit.”187
Third, Netanel suggests that courts temper infringement liability by
limiting damages to a reasonable licensing fee in cases where the defendant
has established a colorable (although unsuccessful) claim of fair use.188
Netanel observes that, under current law, copyright holders are entitled to
“what amount[s] to punitive or expropriative damages” through the
imposition of both actual damages from infringement as well as the
disgorgement of profits earned by the infringer attributable to
infringement.189 Professor Netanel has elsewhere described this proposal
as, “in effect, issuing a compulsory license to further the ‘strong public
interest in the publication of the secondary work.’”190
Professor Netanel’s proposal for reshaping the fair use doctrine to
deemphasize consideration of the secondary use’s market impact provides
an especially helpful starting point for establishing a copyright right of
publicity, but would require the personality to engage in further
transformation of the copyrighted depiction. However, if one were to
accept Professor Tushnet’s arguments about the speech-enhancing benefits
of nontransformative copying, then perhaps there should be room for
protecting the personality’s nontransformative commercial use of his own
depiction in the copyrighted work as well. To the extent the right to engage
in nontransformative copying derives from the need to engage in selfexpressive speech, the case for exempting nontransformative copying from
infringement liability would seem strongest in the context of a personality’s
speech about his own depiction in a copyrighted work, regardless of the
commercial nature of the use. This is particularly true given that the
copyright holder acquired, for free, the right to depict the personality in the
copyrighted work and to sell that work for profit.
Furthermore, a depicted personality’s nontransformative commercial use
of the copyrighted depiction would not necessarily adversely affect the
market for the original copyrighted work. Indeed, it is entirely possible
(and, in many cases, likely) that the personality’s commercial use of his
own depiction would have the effect of enhancing rather than detracting
from the value of the copyright. The personality’s act of publically using
the copyrighted depiction can provide a unique and special form of
publicity for the original work that often cannot be attained through
traditional avenues of paid marketing and advertising. Of course, this
value-enhancing potential also suggests that copyright holders have an
economic incentive to willingly permit the nontransformative use absent a
mandatory legal exemption from copyright enforcement.
In situating the fair use proposal above within Netanel’s First
Amendment-animated fair use framework, judicial reform of the doctrine
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1, 84 (2001) (quoting Leval, supra note 55, at 1132).
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might involve a reevaluation of the relationship between the second
statutory factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” and the fourth factor,
“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”191 Where the nature of the copyrighted work involves a
depiction of the personality, the personality should be entitled to greater
leeway in making commercial secondary use of the copyrighted depiction
regardless of the transformative character of that use. Greater leeway in
this regard would also help to scale back the overexpansion of exclusionary
rights associated with derivative works.192
Expanding upon Netanel’s proposal to reform damage awards in cases
where the would-be infringer establishes a colorable claim of fair use, a
legislative reform might draw on the existing statutory copyright system of
compulsory licensing. This system allows for use of certain statutorily
covered copyrighted material by right, provided that the user pay a fee to
the copyright holder in accordance with a licensing schedule established by
the federal Copyright Royalty Board.193 Granting a compulsory license to
personalities depicted in a copyrighted work would alleviate the inhibition
of speech arising from a copyright holder’s withholding permission even
when offered a licensing fee by the personality. Under a compulsory
licensing system, a personality would never be prohibited from using his
own depiction in a copyrighted work, but would have to pay a
presumptively reasonable licensing fee set by the government. If, however,
there is dignity value associated with the right to engage in expression
about one’s own life experience, including the right to use a copyrighted
depiction of oneself, then it might be offensive to that notion to allow a
copyright holder who has appropriated a person’s name and likeness
without permission to charge that person for use of the copyrighted
depiction.
Another path toward recognizing a copyright right of publicity might
involve expanding the statutory categorical exemptions from copyright
enforcement. Over time, the copyright statutes have become replete with
categorical exemptions from copyright enforcement.194 Some categorical

191. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107(2), (4) (2012).
192. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 7, at 545 (“The derivative works right thus threatens to
give copyright owners power to control interesting, creative, and culturally significant reuses
of their works. Even a successful fair use defense is expensive, and the risk of such a lawsuit
deters publishers from investing in potentially infringing works; that kind of self-censorship
is traditionally a matter of concern to the First Amendment. As a result, a number of
scholars have suggested that the derivative works right should be sharply cut back to provide
some free speech breathing room for writers building on prior works (as we all must do, in
one way or another).”).
193. See, e.g., Robert Kirk Walker, Negotiating the Unknown: A Compulsory Licensing
Solution to the Orphan Works Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 983, 1005–06 (2014) (“The
Copyright Act provides for several different compulsory licenses: For the reproduction of
non-dramatic musical compositions (so-called ‘mechanical rights’), public broadcasting,
retransmission by cable TV systems, subscription audio transmission, and non-subscription
digital audio transmissions, such as Internet radio. The Copyright Royalty Board sets
compulsory licensing fees.”).
194. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 110, 115, 120.
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exemptions reflect reasonable accommodation for the public’s speech
interest in using the copyrighted work. For example, under 17 U.S.C.
§ 120(a), the public has an absolute right to produce, display, and distribute
visual depictions of a copyrighted architectural work for free and without
permission where the architectural work is manifested in a building visible
to the public. This type of exemption furthers First Amendment speechpromoting goals by granting the public unqualified latitude to use this type
of copyrighted work in visual depictions. Other categorical exemptions
appear more random and selective in scope and application,195 thus
demonstrating a willingness by Congress to establish special exemptions
from copyright enforcement in settings it deems appropriate. For the
reasons described in this Article, Congress would be justified in enacting a
statutory categorical exemption recognizing a copyright right of publicity
along these lines.
The judicial and legislative reforms proposed above represent only a few
of the ways through which copyright law might provide limited recognition
for a copyright right of publicity. I leave to others the task of building upon
this analysis to implement reforms that grant individuals the right to use
copyrighted depictions of themselves without infringement liability.
CONCLUSION
I conclude with a final illustrative hypothetical: In March 2015,
playwright John Strand mounted a Washington, D.C., production of The
Originalist, a play portraying the judge–clerk relationship between the late
United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia and a
fictionalized liberal law clerk.196 Of the three characters in Strand’s play,
the fictional Justice Scalia dominates the stage work. In an interview with
the New York Times, Strand stated that he did not write the play to mock
Justice Scalia, but conceded that his portrayal of a sitting Supreme Court

195. Section 110(6), for example, provides that “performance of a nondramatic musical
work by a governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization, in the
course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by such body or
organization” is categorically not an infringement of copyright. Id. § 110(6). In another
example, § 109(e) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106(4) and 106(5), in the case of an
electronic audiovisual game intended for use in coin-operated equipment, the
owner of a particular copy of such a game lawfully made under this title, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner of the game, to publicly
perform or display that game in coin-operated equipment, except that this
subsection shall not apply to any work of authorship embodied in the audiovisual
game if the copyright owner of the electronic audiovisual game is not also the
copyright owner of the work of authorship.
Id. § 109(e).
196. See World-Premiere Political Drama The Originalist, ARENA STAGE, http://www.
arenastage.org/shows-tickets/the-season/productions/the-originalist/ (last visited Apr. 29,
2016) [https://perma.cc/7VE4-ZQGU]; Adam Liptak, “The Originalist,” a New Play About
Justice Antonin Scalia by John Strand, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/03/12/theater/the-originalist-a-new-play-about-justice-antonin-scalia-byjohn-strand.html [https://perma.cc/75ZX-ADY7].
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justice was risky and “probably crossing a line.”197 But because The
Originalist’s depiction of Justice Scalia manifests a transformative use of
Scalia’s persona, the First Amendment protects Strand’s right to
disseminate the depiction in his play without obtaining permission from or
paying Justice Scalia’s estate, which would, but for the First Amendment,
otherwise have the right to assert a state-law right of publicity in states that
recognize post-mortem publicity rights. Suppose, however, that Justice
Scalia were still alive198 and wished to internalize and self-actualize
Strand’s play, not by critiquing or commenting on it, but by mounting his
own publicly staged competing production of the work starring himself as
Justice Scalia. Under copyright law, Strand would have the right to enjoin
Justice Scalia from portraying himself in such a production of The
Originalist as unlawful infringement, or, alternatively, charge a licensing
fee. This constraint on Justice Scalia’s ability to engage in self-expression
about a copyrighted depiction of himself reflects an asymmetrical and
normatively unfair preference for Strand’s freedoms of expression and
autonomy over the same freedoms of expression and autonomy to which
Justice Scalia, were he still living, should also have been entitled.
The First Amendment overrides state-law publicity claims to protect the
right of authors to engage in creative expression depicting an individual’s
name and likeness, but constitutional doctrine provides a lesser degree of
protection for the speech and autonomy interests of individuals whose
depiction has been appropriated in a copyrighted work. I believe, however,
that, once an individual’s name or likeness has been appropriated without
consent in a copyrighted work, that individual should have greater leeway
in using his own copyrighted depiction without incurring infringement
liability or the specter of costly infringement litigation. This normative
claim is consistent with a growing critique of copyright law and its
overreaching burden on the speech and liberty interests of would-be
infringers seeking to engage in speech not otherwise protected by the safe
harbor of the current fair use doctrine. That a person could be enjoined
from engaging in speech about his own depiction in a copyrighted work
vividly illustrates the speech-inhibiting effects of contemporary copyright
law.
In this context, copyright law imposes significant burdens on the depicted
personality’s speech and liberty interests, but I conclude that the
Constitution itself does not mandate a copyright exemption in this context.
This Article therefore proposes a statutory and judicial framework for
reform to protect a person’s speech about herself, even though not
mandated by the Constitution, on normative grounds that favor
enhancement of speech protection.
My proposal for “a copyright right of publicity” would create a limited
copyright exemption providing greater leeway for an individual to use a
depiction of herself embodied in a copyrighted work. This reform might be
197. Liptak, supra note 196.
198. Justice Scalia died shortly before the publication of this Article.
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achieved through judicial expansion of the fair use doctrine, or statutory
reform providing a compulsory license or categorical exemption from
copyright enforcement.

